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Essays on the Economics of People
and Places
Bryan A. Stuart
This dissertation contains three essays that examine the
long-run consequences of economic and social processes on
people, places, and the economy. The first chapter examines
the long-run effects of the 1980–1982 recession on education and income. Using confidential Census data, I estimate
difference-in-differences regressions that exploit variation
across counties in recession severity and across cohorts in
age at the time of the recession. For individuals aged 0–10
in 1979, a 10 percent decrease in earnings per capita in their
county of birth reduces four-year college degree attainment
by 9 percent and income in adulthood by 3 percent. I find little evidence that states with more generous or more progressive transfer systems mitigated these long-run effects. Simple
calculations suggest that, in aggregate, the 1980–1982
recession led to 1–3 million fewer college graduates and
$64–$145 billion less earned income per year.
The second chapter, with Evan Taylor, examines the
effects of birth town migration networks on location decisions. We study over one million long-run location decisions
made during two landmark migration episodes by African
Americans from the South and whites from the Great Plains.
We develop a new method to estimate the strength of migration networks for each receiving and sending location. Our
estimates imply that when one randomly chosen African
American moves from a birth town to a destination county,
then 1.9 additional black migrants make the same move
on average. For white migrants from the Great Plains, the
average is only 0.4. Networks were particularly important
in connecting black migrants with attractive employment
opportunities and played a larger role in less costly moves.
The third chapter, also with Taylor, estimates the effect
of social connectedness on crime across cities from 1970 to
2009. Migration networks among African Americans from
the South generated variation across destinations in the
concentration of migrants from the same birth town. Using
this novel source of variation, we find that social connectedness considerably reduces murders, rapes, robberies, assaults,
burglaries, larcenies, and motor vehicle thefts, with a one
standard deviation increase in social connectedness reducing murders by 23 percent and motor vehicle thefts by 18
percent. Social connectedness especially reduces murders
of adolescents and young adults committed during gang and
drug activity.
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Chapter 1
The Long-Run Effects of Recessions on
Education and Income
Recessions receive tremendous attention from economists, policymakers, and the public. Most of this attention
focuses on the short-run effects of recessions on workers’
labor market outcomes and firms’ investment and employment decisions. In addition to these short-run effects, recessions could have consequential long-run effects, especially if
they affect human capital attainment. Influential theoretical
and empirical work emphasizes the role of opportunity cost:
by reducing labor market opportunities, recessions might
increase educational attainment (e.g., Atkin 2016; Becker
1962; Black, McKinnish, and Sanders 2005; Cascio and
Narayan 2015; Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo 2018).
The opportunity cost channel is most relevant for individuals making high school and college enrollment decisions during the recession. However, recessions could affect
younger individuals, for whom mechanisms besides opportunity cost, such as a decrease in human capital investments
during childhood, might dominate. Consequently, the size
and even sign of long-run effects are an empirical question.
This paper estimates the long-run effects of recessions on
education and income, for individuals who were children,
adolescents, and young adults when the recession began.
I focus on the 1980–1982 double-dip recession in the
United States, which followed large increases in interest
rates and the price of oil. The recession was concentrated
in certain industries, like durable goods manufacturing and
wood products, and counties with preexisting specialization
in these industries experienced a more severe recession.
The 1980–1982 recession is a valuable setting because its
timing permits the study of counties’ prerecession economic
conditions and individuals’ long-run outcomes. I show that
the recession led to a persistent relative decrease in earnings
per capita and median family income in negatively affected
counties. This persistent decrease in local economic activity
is central in considering the long-run effects on individuals.
I estimate the long-run effects of the 1980–1982 recession using newly available confidential data. I link the 2000
Census and 2001–2013 American Community Surveys to
the Social Security Administration NUMIDENT file, which
allows me to observe outcomes in adulthood and county of
birth for 23 million individuals born between 1950 and 1979.
With these data, I estimate generalized difference-indifferences regressions that compare education and income
in adulthood of individuals born in counties with a more
versus less severe recession (first difference) and individuals
who were younger versus older when the recession began
(second difference). I isolate the effect of local labor demand
shifts that emerged during the recession by instrumenting
for the 1978–1982 change in log real earnings per capita,
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with the log employment change predicted by the interaction
of a county’s preexisting industrial structure and aggregate
employment changes (Bartik 1991). This empirical strategy identifies the overall effect of the recession on long-run
outcomes, inclusive of any mitigating actions by parents and
communities.
I find that the 1980–1982 recession led to sizable long-run
reductions in education and income. For individuals aged
0–10 in 1979, a 10 percent decrease in real earnings per
capita in their county of birth, which is around one standard deviation, leads to a 3.0 percentage point (9.4 percent)
decrease in four-year college degree attainment. The negative
effects on college graduation are most severe and essentially
constant for individuals aged 0–13 in 1979. This age profile
suggests that the underlying mechanisms are a decline in
childhood human capital or a long-term decline in parental
resources to pay for college. Because I estimate small and
statistically insignificant effects on college graduation for
individuals aged 14–19 in 1979, short-term credit constraints
in paying for college appear less important. I find little
evidence of an effect on college attendance or high school
graduation. For individuals aged 0–10 in 1979, a 10 percent
decrease in real earnings per capita leads to a $1,300 (3.2
percent) decrease in earned income and a 1.7 percentage
point (13.9 percent) increase in the probability of living in
poverty. Simple calculations and additional regressions suggest that much of the long-run effects on income stem from
the effects on education.
An important question is whether government policies
mitigated these long-run effects. To examine this, I characterize two relevant dimensions of state transfer systems as
of 1970. First, I measure transfer generosity as the amount
of transfers per capita, conditional on standard economic
and demographic variables. Second, I measure transfer
progressivity as the degree to which states transferred higher
amounts to poorer counties, conditional on standard variables. I find little evidence that states with more generous
or more progressive transfer systems mitigated the long-run
effects.
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of my
empirical strategy. First, I show that earnings per capita
evolved similarly before 1980 in counties with a more
versus less severe recession. Second, I find no evidence of
a relationship between the severity of the recession and the
evolution of maternal education, infant birth weight, or infant
mortality before 1980. Finally, I conduct falsification tests by
estimating the effect of the recession on education for individuals aged 23–28 in 1979, using 29-year-olds as a comparison group. I find no evidence of an effect for 23–28-yearolds, who largely completed their schooling before the
recession. These findings strongly suggest that my estimates
reflect the long-run effects of the 1980–1982 recession.
The magnitude of my estimates and the large number of
affected individuals suggest that the 1980–1982 recession
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depresses aggregate economic output today. To gauge the
aggregate effects, I scale my estimates by the 105 million
individuals born in the United States from 1951 to 1979.
Depending on the assumed evolution of earnings per capita
in the absence of the recession, back of the envelope calculations suggest that the 1980–1982 recession led to 0.9–2.1
million fewer four-year college graduates, $64–$145 billion
less earned income per year (as of 2000–2013), and 0.5–1.3
million more adults living in poverty each year. These numbers represent 1–3 percent of the stock of college-educated
adults in 2015, 0.4–0.8 percent of 2015 GDP, and 1–3 percent of the number of individuals in poverty in 2015. While
these calculations could understate or overstate the true
aggregate effects, as I discuss in detail, the long-run effects
that I document clearly are important channels through
which recessions affect welfare and economic growth.
This paper shows that the 1980–1982 recession persistently decreased earnings per capita in negatively affected
counties, and children and adolescents born in these counties have less education and income as adults. In addition, I
show that every U.S. recession since 1973 has persistently
decreased earnings per capita in negatively affected counties.
This novel stylized fact indicates that the 1980–1982 recession is not unique in its persistent effects on county-level
earnings per capita, which suggests that it might not be
unique in its long-run effects on human capital attainment.
Similar long-run effects could arise from other shocks leading to persistent declines in local economic activity, such as
Chinese import competition (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013)
and NAFTA (McLaren and Hakobyan 2016).
This paper contributes to four distinct literatures. First is
the literature on the effect of labor market opportunities on
contemporaneous schooling enrollment, with a focus on the
role of opportunity cost (Atkin 2016; Black, McKinnish, and
Sanders 2005; Cascio and Narayan 2015; Charles, Hurst and
Notowidigdo 2018). I complement this literature by estimating effects on a wider age range, including children and adolescents, which is possible because of newly available data.
Second is the literature on the role of early life conditions in shaping human capital and productivity (for recent
reviews, see Almond, Currie, and Duque [2017] and
Heckman and Mosso [2014]). This literature provides very
little direct evidence on the long-run effects of recessions
on education and income. Furthermore, Chetty and Hendren (2018) find little relationship between local economic
conditions and the effect of a place on children’s long-run
outcomes. As a result, considerable uncertainty exists about
the magnitude and sign of recessions’ long-run effects. Evidence on the size of these effects is necessary for weighing
the potential benefits of mitigating policies, and for assessing whether these long-run effects should be incorporated
into theoretical and empirical models of recessions and the
economy. My primary contribution, facilitated by newly
available data, is estimating the long-run effects of a reces-
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sion on education and income. I find that the long-run effects
on children’s and adolescents’ income are more severe than
the effects on individuals entering, or already in, the labor
market at the time of the recession.1
This paper also contributes to work on the welfare costs
of recessions. Most of this literature focuses on the costs of
intertemporal substitution in consumption (see the review
in Lucas [2003]). In contrast, I study costs that stem from
long-run declines in children’s and adolescents’ human capital attainment. My results imply that recessions are costlier
than previously thought and point to new possible targets
for social insurance and economic stabilization policies.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature studying how
recessions affect subsequent economic activity. An influential strand of this literature examines recessions’ cleansing
effects, which increase productivity as less productive firms
exit and resources are reallocated to remaining firms (e.g.,
Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996; Foster, Grim, and
Haltiwanger 2016; Schumpeter 1939). My results demonstrate that recessions also affect productivity in a markedly
different way, by reducing children’s and adolescents’ human
capital attainment.

Chapter 2
Social Interactions and Location Decisions:
Evidence from U.S. Mass Migration
(with Evan Taylor)
Theoretical and empirical research emphasizes the role of
expected real wages, amenities, and moving costs in individuals’ location decisions (e.g., Kennan and Walker 2011;
Sjaastad 1962). While theory suggests that social networks
might matter as well (Carrington, Detragiache, and Vishwanath 1996), estimating the importance of this factor has
proven difficult because of a lack of suitable data sets and
research designs. For example, it is well known that immigrants from the same country tend to live in the same place,
but this fact does not distinguish between the role of social
networks and numerous common factors, such as moving
costs, human capital, and language. Evidence on the effects
of social networks on location decisions would inform our
understanding of past and future migration episodes, the
equilibration of local labor markets, and the impacts of
policies that affect migration incentives. Furthermore, social
networks might continue to attract migrants to their chosen
destination for many years, thus limiting adjustments as
economic conditions change, and ultimately contributing to
spatial mismatch.
This paper provides new evidence on the effects of social
networks on location decisions. We focus on the mass
migrations in the mid-twentieth century of African Ameri-
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cans from the U.S. South and whites from the Great Plains.
We proxy for social networks using birth towns, which are
particularly relevant in this setting, and we use administrative data that measure town of birth and county of residence
at old age for most of the U.S. population born from 1916
to 1936. Our setting and data provide a unique opportunity
to study the long-run effects of migration networks. We use
detailed geographic information to distinguish the effect
of birth town migration networks from other determinants
of location decisions, such as moving costs determined by
geography or railroad lines. For example, we observe that
51 percent of African American migrants born from 1916 to
1936 in Pigeon Creek, Alabama, moved to Niagara County,
New York, while less than 6 percent of black migrants from
nearby towns moved to the same county. This comparison
underlies our research design, which asks whether individuals born in the same town are more likely to live in the same
destination in old age than individuals born in nearby towns.
We combine this transparent research design with a new
method of characterizing birth town migration networks.
Our new parameter, which we call the network index, allows
us to estimate the effect of migration networks on location
decisions for each receiving and sending location and then
relate these estimates to locations’ economic characteristics.
We show that existing methods may mischaracterize the
effect of migration networks in our setting. In particular, the
influential approach of Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008) could
estimate strong effects for popular destinations, even if true
effects are relatively weak, and as a result could misstate
the overall effect of networks. Our method does not suffer
from this problem. Under straightforward and partly testable
assumptions, the network index identifies the effect of birth
town migration networks and maps directly to structural
network models.
We find that migration networks strongly influenced the
location decisions of Southern black migrants. Our estimates
imply that when one randomly chosen African American
moves from a birth town to a destination county, then 1.9
additional black migrants make the same move on average.
Migration networks drew African Americans to destinations
with a higher share of 1910 employment in manufacturing, a
particularly attractive sector for black workers in our sample.
This evidence highlights an important role for migration
networks in providing job referrals or information about
employment opportunities. We also find that networks drew
black migrants to destinations that were closer and more connected by railroads, pointing to the importance of access to
information and low moving costs in the functioning of these
networks. In addition, networks are stronger in sending counties with higher literacy rates in 1920, suggesting that education and related factors facilitated network development.
We estimate weaker effects of migration networks on the
location decisions of whites. For migrants from the Great
Plains, our results imply that when one randomly chosen
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migrant moves from a birth town to a destination county,
then 0.4 additional white migrants make the same move on
average. Results for Southern white migrants are similarly
small. Furthermore, migration networks among whites are
less sensitive to employment opportunities and moving costs.
There are many possible explanations for the different effects
of networks on black and white migrants. Given the myriad
unobserved differences between these groups, this paper does
not attempt to explain the black-white gap. However, one
explanation supported by historical context and our results is
that black migrants relied more heavily on their networks to
overcome discrimination in labor and housing markets and a
lack of financial resources.
To further study the role of migration networks, we map
the network index to a structural model that generalizes the
model in Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996). We
estimate that 34 percent of Southern black migrants and 13
percent of Great Plains white migrants chose their long-run
destination because of migration networks. In the absence of
networks, Chicago would have 29 percent fewer Southern
black migrants, and Los Angeles, Detroit, Philadelphia, and
Baltimore would have 11–25 percent fewer black migrants.
Eliminating migration networks would reduce the number of
Great Plains white migrants in several places in California,
including Los Angeles, Bakersfield, and Fresno. While our
model does not account for all possible general equilibrium
effects, the direction of these effects is not clear: reducing
migration from a town to a county could make that destination more attractive because of higher wages or lower housing costs, or less attractive because of fewer individuals with
a similar background. Still, the model suggests that migration networks had important effects on the U.S. population
distribution.
We use the structural model to examine whether migrants
would live in destinations with better economic opportunities in the absence of networks, as could occur if networks
contributed to spatial mismatch. In the absence of migration
networks, Southern black migrants would live in counties
with a slightly smaller African American population share,
unemployment rate, and poverty rate, while Great Plains
white migrants would live in counties that are nearly identical. Migration networks have little effect on destination
characteristics because migrants who did not follow their
network moved to similar destinations.
Several pieces of evidence support the validity of our
empirical strategy. Our research design, which compares the
location decisions of migrants from nearby towns, implies
that destination-level network index estimates should not
change when controlling for birth town characteristics,
because geographic proximity controls for the relevant determinants of location decisions. Reassuringly, our estimates
are essentially unchanged when adding several covariates.
We also estimate strong network effects in certain locations,
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like Rock County, Wisconsin, for which qualitative work
supports our findings (Bell 1933; Wilkerson 2010).
This paper makes three contributions. First, we develop
a new method of characterizing migration networks. Our
approach integrates previous work by Bayer, Ross, and Topa
(2008) and Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996). It
has desirable theoretical and statistical properties and can be
used to study networks in other settings and for outcomes
besides migration. Second, we provide new evidence on the
importance of birth town migration networks and the types
of individuals and economic conditions for which networks
are most important.2 Previous work shows that individuals
tend to migrate to the same place, often broadly defined,
as other individuals from the same town or country, but
does not isolate the role of social networks in the decision
of where to move (Bartel 1989; Bauer, Epstein, and Gang
2005; Beine, Docquier, and Ozden 2011). Third, our results
inform landmark migration episodes that have drawn interest
from economists for a century (e.g., Boustan 2010; Chay and
Munshi 2015; Collins 1997; Hornbeck 2012; Margo 1990;
Scroggs 1917).

Chapter 3
The Effect of Social Connectedness on Crime:
Evidence from the Great Migration
(with Evan Taylor)
For almost 200 years, the enormous variance of crime
rates across space has intrigued social scientists and policymakers (Guerry 1833; Quetelet 1835; Weisburd, Bruinsma,
and Bernasco 2009). Standard covariates explain relatively
little of the cross-city variation in crime, which suggests
a potential role for social influences (Glaeser, Sacerdote,
and Scheinkman 1996). One possible explanation is peer
effects, whereby an individual is more likely to commit
crime if his or her peers commit crime (e.g., Case and Katz
1991; Damm and Dustmann 2014; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and
Scheinkman 1996). A nonrival explanation is that cities differ
in the degree of social connectedness, or the strength of
relationships between individuals, including those unlikely to
commit crime.
There is widespread interest in the effects of social
connectedness and the related concept of social capital.
This interest partly stems from the possibility that relationships between individuals can address market failures and
generate desirable outcomes that are difficult to accomplish
with government policies. However, estimating the effects
of social connectedness and social capital has proved to be
challenging. Some of the most influential evidence comes
from correlations between outcomes, such as income and
crime, and proxies for social capital, like individuals’ partic-
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ipation in community organizations, their stated willingness
to intervene in the community, and their stated willingness
to trust others (Putnam 2000; Sampson, Raudenbush, and
Earls 1997). These proxies for social capital reflect individuals’ contemporaneous decisions to invest in their communities, which raises the concern that these correlations
reflect reverse causality or omitted variables bias. As a result,
the empirical importance of social capital continues to be
debated (Durlauf 2002).
This paper uses a new source of variation in social
connectedness to estimate its effect on crime. Migration
networks among millions of African Americans who moved
out of the South between 1915 and 1970 generated variation
across destinations in the concentration of migrants from
the same birth town. For example, consider Beloit, Wisconsin, and Middletown, Ohio, two cities similar along many
dimensions, including the total number of Southern black
migrants that moved there. Around 18 percent of Beloit’s
black migrants came from Pontotoc, Mississippi, while less
than 5 percent of Middletown’s migrants came from any
single town. Historical accounts trace the sizable migration
from Pontotoc to Beloit to a single influential migrant, John
McCord, getting a job in 1914 at a manufacturer in search of
workers. Furthermore, ethnographic and newspaper accounts
suggest that Southern birth town networks translated into
strong community ties in the North. Guided by a simple
economic model, we proxy for social connectedness using a
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of birth town to destination city
population flows for African Americans born in the South
between 1916 and 1936, whom we observe in the Duke SSA/
Medicare data set. We focus on social connectedness among
black migrants because birth town migration networks are
especially strong among this group (Chapter 2), and qualitative and quantitative evidence supports our empirical
strategy.
We estimate regressions that relate cross-city differences
in crime from 1970 to 2009 to cross-city differences in
social connectedness. The historical literature suggests that,
conditional on economic and social opportunities, variation
in social connectedness stems from idiosyncratic factors, like
the right migrant being in the right place at the right time.
To exploit this variation, we control for population, manufacturing employment (the largest sector in which African
American migrants worked), and the black population share
from 1920 to 1960. Our regressions also include the number
of Southern black migrants who live in each city, to adjust
for differences in the overall attractiveness of cities to black
migrants, and for contemporaneous population, land area,
and state-by-year fixed effects. City-level crime counts come
from FBI Uniform Crime Reports.
We find that social connectedness leads to sizable reductions in crime rates. The elasticity of the crime rate with
respect to social connectedness ranges from −0.09 to −0.26
across the seven index crimes of murder, rape, robbery,
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assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, and is
statistically distinguishable from zero for every crime. At the
mean, a one standard deviation increase in social connectedness leads to a precisely estimated 22 percent decrease in
murder, the best measured crime in FBI data. Our estimates
imply that replacing Middletown’s social connectedness with
that of Beloit would decrease murders and robberies by 37
percent and motor vehicle thefts by 30 percent. By comparison, the estimates in Chalfin and McCrary (2018) imply that
a similar decrease in murders would require a 55 percent
increase in the number of police officers.
Because social connectedness arises from individuals’
location decisions, a natural concern is whether our estimates
reflect causal effects. The validity of our empirical strategy
hinges on whether social connectedness is correlated with
unobserved determinants of crime from 1970 to 2009, conditional on the covariates described above. Historical accounts
emphasize the importance of migrants who were well connected in their birth towns and who worked for an employer
in search of labor in establishing concentrated migration
flows from Southern birth towns to Northern cities (Gottlieb
1987; Grossman 1989; Scott 1920). It is unlikely that these
idiosyncratic factors are correlated with unobserved determinants of crime some 50 years later. These considerations
provide qualitative support for our empirical strategy.
We marshal a wide range of quantitative support for our
empirical strategy. First, 79 percent of the variation in social
connectedness stems from a single birth town-to-destination
city migration flow. This agrees with historical accounts
that emphasize the importance of the right migrant being in
the right place at the right time. Second, social connectedness is not correlated with murder rates from 1911–1916 or
1936–1939. This implies that connected groups of migrants
did not simply locate in low crime cities. The first two pieces
of evidence support our key identifying assumption.
To provide even stronger support, we show that our
results are robust to selection on both observed and unobserved variables. Our results are robust to a battery of additional controls: contemporaneous economic and demographic
factors, the number and concentration of white migrants
and immigrants, and characteristics of counties from which
migrants came. Our results also are robust to controlling for
the share of migrants in each destination that moved there
because of their birth town migration network. This variable,
which we estimate using a structural model of location decisions, controls for a range of unobserved characteristics of
migrants. Finally, we develop a more general test of selection
on unobserved variables. The main threat to identification is
that connected groups of migrants moved to cities with low
crime rates, and unobserved determinants of crime persisted
over time. In the presence of this unobserved selection,
controlling for the 1960–1969 crime rate would eliminate the
relationship between crime and social connectedness from
1970 to 2009. In contrast, if our empirical strategy is valid,

15

then controlling for the 1960–1969 crime rate would partly
attenuate the estimated effect of social connectedness, and
this attenuation would diminish over time; this is exactly
what we find, which rules out the main threat to identification. All this evidence supports our empirical strategy.
Several additional results clarify the mechanisms through
which social connectedness reduces crime. Social connectedness reduces crimes that are more and less likely to have
witnesses, which suggests that an increased probability of
detection is not the only operative mechanism. The effect
of social connectedness on crime is not driven by effects on
employment, education, homeownership, the prevalence of
single parents, or crack cocaine use (which emerged in the
mid-1980s). Other mechanisms, such as effects on norms or
noncognitive skills, likely matter. We see the largest reductions in murders of adolescents and young adults, committed
by acquaintances or strangers, during gang, drug, and other
felonious activity. Furthermore, the effect of social connectedness on crime is persistent: even in the 2000s, when many
of the original Southern migrants were no longer alive, crime
rates were lower in cities with higher social connectedness.
Natural explanations for this persistence include changing
norms or skills, which are passed down across generations,
and path dependence in crime (Nagin and Paternoster 1991).
We use variation in social connectedness that has the
unusual and attractive property of being initially established decades before we measure outcomes as the result
of a known process—birth town migration networks. This
facilitates our primary contribution, which is providing new,
more credible evidence on the effect of social connectedness
on crime. We also contribute to the literature in economics studying how social capital and trust relate to various
outcomes, including growth and development (Knack and
Keefer 1997; Miguel, Gertler, and Levine 2005), government
efficiency and public good provision (Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly 1997; La Porta et al. 1997), financial development
(Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004), microfinance (Karlan
2005, 2007; Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick 2007), and intergenerational mobility (Chetty et al. 2014).3
More broadly, there is enormous interest in the causes and
consequences of criminal activity and incarceration in U.S.
cities, especially for African Americans (Evans, Garthwaite,
and Moore 2016; Freeman 1999; Neal and Rick 2014), and
this paper demonstrates the importance of social connectedness in reducing crime. We also add to the literature on the
consequences of the Great Migration for migrants and cities,
which has not considered the effects of social connectedness.
This paper draws on Chapter 2 of my dissertation, which
examines the role of birth town migration networks in more
detail.
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Notes
1. Recent studies on the effect of entry labor market conditions on
workers include Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2016); Kahn (2010);
Hershbein (2012); Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2012).
2. This complements research on the effects of social networks
on labor market outcomes (e.g., Bayer, Ross and Topa 2008;
Beaman 2012; Hellerstein, McInerney, and Neumark 2011;
Ioannides and Loury 2004; Munshi 2003; Topa 2001). These
papers do not focus on the formation of social networks, which
in some cases, like Munshi (2003), arise from location decisions.
3. Social connectedness is a broader concept than social capital,
trust, or collective efficacy. For example, social connectedness
might reduce crime by increasing the probability that criminals
are identified, and this behavior typically is not included in
definitions of social capital, trust, or collective efficacy. At the
same time, our measure might capture social capital that was
transported from the South. Definitions of social capital vary, but
Portes (1998) argues that a consensus definition is “the ability
of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social
networks or other social structures” (p. 6). Bowles and Gintis
(2002), Fukuyama (1995), and Putnam (2000) emphasize the
role of trust and reciprocity in their definition of social capital.
Karlan (2007) makes distinction between social capital and
social connections similar to ours.
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